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This study sheds light on the current patterns of punishing behavior. Experimen-
tal work with ultimatum bargaining shows that individuals have a high sensitivity to
fairness, and when taken advantage of, are willing to endure costs to punish deviant
behavior. Third party observers of the unfair behavior asked to represent ultima-
tum recipients are more hesitant to engage in such punishment. This becomes ever
more puzzling when we consider individuals’ high value of their own reputation in
similar settings. This leaves both rational choice modelers and political psychologists
puzzled. This study presents the baseline model for a research agenda proposing a
multi-agent modeling approach that allows for analysis of the observed behavior’s
adaptiveness from an evolutionary perspective. Understanding discrepancies between
individual and representative third party behavior is crucial for understanding issues
of political representation.
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1Chapter 1
Introduction
The goal of social science is to understand behavior, to figure out why people do what
they do. Of course such a question cannot be tackled in its entirety. Punishment is
a foundational behavioral trait. Though at first glance we would expect an analysis
of punishing behavior to come from other disciplines, I would argue that observed
patterns of punishment have relevance to political science.
A preliminary experimental study which recently persuaded the NSF to fund
further analysis, conducted by Hibbing and Alford, showed that people subjected
to unfair treatment are willing to endure high costs to punish their persecutors [1].
Recent science article presented neuro-scientific evidence that punishers of deviant
behavior derive satisfaction from punishment and the anticipation of punishment [2].
But when a third party is asked to represent the mistreated, they are not likely to
make the same decision, at least in cases where the cost of punishment is borne by the
mistreated and not the representative [1]. To complicate the matter further, studies
have also concluded that participants of such experiments have a high sensitivity
to what non-participants, like the experimenter and other observing parties, will
think about their actions. According to Larimer, the level of anonymity significantly
2influences participants’ actions within an experiment [3] [4]. Simply put, while third
parties are more reluctant to punish deviant behavior than parties involved in the
interaction, decision makers in such settings still care about how non-participants
will perceive them.
Representation is one of the most basic behavior that interests political scientists.
Scenarios similar to the abstraction described above are played out in real life every
day, in the courts and among elected and appointed decision makers representing the
public. This lack of fit between the behavioral tendencies of the mistreated and their
representatives should interest political scientists. Understanding these behavioral
traits will allow us to better understand representation and misrepresentation.
Hibbing and Alford’s study took an experimental approach and used ultimatum
bargaining to study punishment. Ultimatum bargaining is a popular experimental
design in the field of experimental game theory and behavioral economics. In its
classic form, it is a game with two players: an allocator (or offerer), and a receiver (or
recipient). The allocator receives a predetermined amount1 from an outside source
(usually an experimenter) to divide between him/her self and the receiver. The
receiver can either accept this allocation and both parties will walk home with the
amount in hand, or reject it, in which case neither player gets anything.
Ultimatum bargaining was first utilized by Gu¨th et al. [5]. Their design was
frequently used by social scientists as their findings were elaborated on. The initial
and consequent experiments have one thing in common - they all show inconsistency
with the microeconomic or rational choice model that assumes full profit maximization
for all individuals. Based on this unrealistic assumption any player would gladly
accept ² regardless of how much the other player would get or how fair the division
1This amount is usually money, but some studies, like Larimer’s, have involved extra credit points
for class; another study used candy with children.
3is.2
In Hibbing and Alford’s experiment the recipient had no power to accept or reject,
but one of his/her peers, whose role was to represent the recipient, was vested with
the power to accept or reject the allocator’s offer. This third party’s decision did not
influence his/her own well being, only the outcome for the other two parties. In their
experimental design the offer was a rigged $3/$17 (15%) allocation in favor of the
offerer. Both the literature and common sense show that this offer is highly unfair,
and would be rejected most of the time,3 as was the case with Alford and Hibbing’s
control group where the experiment was conducted in the traditional manner. With
the third party decision maker, the rejection rate was substantially lower [1].
From a rational profit maximizing point of view $3 is clearly better than nothing,
therefore a rational profit maximizer should accept it. Most people would object that
profit maximization is not the top preference of people. In this study I propose that
an evolutionary approach to the problem will lead us to a better understanding of the
phenomenon and explain the observed behavior without abandoning the principles of
rationality and scientific rigor.
Though the post-hoc nature of evolutionary psychology casts shadows over its
scientific soundness, I have always found asking the classic question: “what made
this behavior adaptive in a hunter gatherer setting?”4 to be a useful intellectual
guide. Punishment is understandable from this perspective. When resources are
scarce, everyone helping everyone else in the group as they gain access to resources
increases everyone’s chance of survival. But if this is the case, the discrepancy between
the behaviors of mistreated individuals and third party observers should not exist.
2² - Epsilon - the lowest possible allocation.
3In their survey of ultimatum literature, Nowak et al. concluded that offers 30% or less are
rejected over 50% of the time [6].
4Evolutionary psychology assumes that all behavioral traits have evolved slowly over time to
serve a specific purpose. Since people spent most of their evolutionary history in a hunter gatherer
setting, all behavior must be analyzed based on its adaptiveness in such a setting.
4The problem with evolution is that it is difficult to recreate for testing purposes.
With multi level modeling, a simplified version of reality can be reproduced and
changes both in the properties of the system and in behavioral patterns that can
be observed over time. These observations shall lead to a better understanding of
why certain behaviors evolved. This study proposes a simple research design in the
hopes that it will either shed light on why punishment deviates so much from rational
expectations, or show how the model needs to be refined to conduct a more realistic
analysis. The results will serve as a useful baseline for future analyses with more
complex models.
5Chapter 2
Multi-Agent Modeling
Methodological individualism is foundational to scientific soundness within most of
the social sciences. Unfortunately this principle is violated all too often in political
science. Waltz’s three levels of analysis have been the foundation of international
relations research, but two of the three levels argue for a level of analysis higher than
the individual [7]. Theories like Modelski’s long cycle theory [8] or Huntington’s three
waves of democratization [9] are just a few examples of theories that explain systems
on higher levels without making the connection to the actions of individuals. Solber
and Wilson lays out a hypothesis that evolution occurs on a group level [10]. Though
both Waltz and Solber and Wilson argue for a multi-level approach to the analysis of
human behavior, none of the works cited offer appropriate methodology. Multi-agent
modeling is the most promising tool to provide the link between the individual and
the group level [11]. The other advantage of social simulation is that time can be
sped up, and therefore interactions can be observed over entire generations [12]. This
is the exact reason why the approach is appropriate to analyze the evolution and the
evolutionary adaptiveness of a phenomenon.
To better understand the discrepancies of punishing behavior between the repre-
6sented and the representer I propose a multi-agent modeling approach. A multi-agent
model is a simulation of society. An “agent” is a self contained piece of software that
controls its own actions (based on pre-set rules which should represent the real world)
based on its perception of its artificial environment. In the case of this study an agent
is an artificial person. These agents are placed inside an artificial space where they
can interact with each other. The sum of these interactions simulate social phenom-
ena. Realizing that simplifications are unavoidable, the designs of both the agent’s
abilities, and the environment they interact in, have to represent the real world.
Simulations have been around since the mid 60’s, when von Neumann created
his self-reproducing automata [13]. The fields where the approach was widely ap-
plied included studies of cellular automata, genetic programming, individual based
modeling in biology, etc. But simulations were rarely applied to the social sciences
[14]. The earliest account was the 1969 Thomas Schelling article on the simulation of
de-facto segregation [15]. Though this article created much excitement, simulations
did not become widely used in the social sciences until the 90’s and even for the
time period in between the only considerable work utilizing simulations was political
scientist Robert Axelrod’s work on cooperation. This piece basically redefined how
cooperation was viewed by modelers [16]. One of the reasons for this is the recent
advancement in computational power and the rise of personal computers, giving so-
cial scientists better access to the tools required to design simulations. Advances in
the fields of artificial intelligence and artificial life have also helped social scientists
to gain more access to better tools to create better agents [14].
Simulations have been used in the past to study punishing behavior. Boyd et al.’s
model shows why punishment is rational even with one-shot interactions in larger
groups [17]. Ultimatum bargaining has also appeared in the simulation literature,
though much to my surprise I was only able to find one instance. Zhong et al. con-
7ducted extensive analysis of learning models and the impact of memory on agent’s
behavior, but did it solely in dyadic interactions between predefined agents [18].
These studies lead to little understanding of why third parties are less likely to
choose punishment when they have to make a decision for someone else - that is, why
there is a lack of fit between the behavior of the representer and the represented. To
better understand the problems with representation, especially in the context of the
courts whose job is specifically to punish deviant behavior, we need to understand
why punishment is adoptive, and why third party punishment is less substantial than
retaliation by the mistreated. The research agenda proposed here attempts to explain
this. Understanding the reasons for such discrepancies between the representer and
the represented will help us design better institutions that offer better representation,
a better fit between the wishes of the representer and the represented. Such findings
will be applicable to both legislative designs and judicial studies.
8Chapter 3
Simulation Design
3.1 Systemic Settings
In this simulation1 social interaction between agents will be proxies by ultimatum bar-
gaining. This study will focus on behavior within homogeneous groups. Each agent’s
behavioral functions will be the same as every other agent’s in the group. Groups
consist of 150 agents unless otherwise noted.2 Simulation will proceed for several
rounds3, in each round agents are randomly paired up and will play the ultimatum
game with each other. Every time the game is played, chance decides which agent
becomes the decision maker, with the wealthier agent having a higher probability of
being in the high power, allocator position. The probability function of an agent (let
us say agent 1) becoming the allocator is w1
w1+w2
. 4
1Technical specifications are described in Appendix A
2I picked 150 because it most resembles the real world. Anthropological evidence suggests that
hunter gatherer tribes had about 150-155 individuals on average [19]
3For most of the analysis presented in this study, the number of rounds in a simulation was set
to 10000.
4Where w1 is the wealth of an agent 1, w2 is the wealth of agent 2.
93.2 Allocation Function
Regardless of the properties of the group, the allocation function is the same for all
agents. Each round, allocating agents are given $10 to divide between themselves and
the recipient. For the sake of simplicity only integer allocations are possible. Initial
allocation is calculated based on a random number generated with an expected mean
of 2.5 and a standard deviation of 1. (xˆ = 2.5, σ = 1) This number is then rounded to
determine the allocation. Allocators also have a learning function, with which they
adjust their offers given their past experiences. If the allocator’s offer is accepted the
agent will adjust its offer function by decreasing xˆ by 0.1 (thinking they can probably
get away with a lower offer next time), if the allocation is rejected, the agent will
increase the xˆ of their allocation function by 0.1 (thinking they should offer a higher
amount next time, if they want their offer to be accepted). Limits are placed at 0
and 5, making these the lowest and highest possible offers.
3.3 The Recipient
The recipients’ behavior differs depending on which group they are in. Rational
agents will accept all allocations above 0. (If a > 0 then accept)5 Realistic agents
have a linear acception function f(p) = (0.2)a6 , also presented in Figure 3.1. For
example, a realistic agent will accept a $5 offer all the time, a $4 offer 80% of the
time, etc., and like rational counterparts, never accept a $0 offer.
5where a is the allocation.
6where p is the probability of offer a being accepted.
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Figure 3.1: Acception Function for Realistic Agents
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3.4 Punishment and Grudge
Beyond the round to round ultimatum game played, agents (realistic ones, but not the
rational ones) also engage in punishing behavior. Agents have a memory and remem-
ber members of the group who gave them an unacceptable offer. Simply speaking,
realistic agents hold grudges. The literature suggests that parties not directly affected
by the transaction are reluctant to punish parties who engage in unfair behavior [1].
On the other hand people do worry about what others (third parties) will think of
their behavior [3]. For this reason I created two distinct groups: (1) where only
the individual who was low-balled holds a grudge against the allocator who treated
him/her unfairly, and (2) where everyone else in the group will be aware of a mem-
ber’s unfair actions and will engage in punishing behavior acting as third parties in
an interaction between two agents. Punishment is simply refusing to play the game,
thus denying the punished agent all financial benefits of the transaction and enduring
the cost of any possible payoff.
The extent of punishment will be measured by either rounds or encounters. Pun-
ishment for t number of rounds means that agent 1 holding a grudge against agent
2 will punish agent 2 if they meet within the following t rounds. Punishment for e
number of encounters means that agent 1 a holding grudge against agent 2 will punish
agent 2 for the next e times they meet, regardless of how many rounds have passed
since the transaction that made agent 1 angry. Simply speaking, when the grudge is
measured by rounds agents are angry for a set amount of time and then they forget.
When the grudge is measured by encounters, agents stay angry until they get back
at the social deviant.
Due to hardware constraints7, I was limited in the number of simulations that I
was able to run. For this reason, I only ran the simulations with t and e set to 3,
7see Appendix A
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25, and 150. Agents in the simulations presented punishment for 3, 25, 150 rounds,
and similarly for 3, 25, 150 encounters. Note that separate simulations were run for
groups where only the individual punished unacceptable offers, and for groups where
the whole group punished deviant behavior.
13
Chapter 4
Evaluation Criteria
Simulations were run 25 times, and after making sure that no arbitrary threshold
existed that modified properties of the group at arbitrary times, results were averaged
across the 25 simulations, within all groups. The distributions of observations were
evaluated at random time slices and appeared to be normal.1
One of the reasons the simulation approach was chosen for this study is that
it serves us with a proper mechanism to infer group behavior as an aggregate of
individual behavior. For this reason I am predominantly interested in the properties
of the group, and not the individuals. Groups will be evaluated based on:
• the number of offers accepted in each round (measuring the amount of conflict
within a group.)
• the total wealth of the group
• the level of equality within the group (measured by the Gini index.)
1For normal distributions, the rule of thumb is to have a minimum of 30 observations. I initially
planned to run all simulations 30 times and evaluate the distribution at random time slices, but the
computer decided that such analysis was beyond its capabilities, limiting me to 25 runs.
14
Chapter 5
Expectations
When I started working on this project the goal was to try to show why rational
behavior is not observed in the real world as much as the neoclassical microeconomic
model would expect. I wanted to show why rational behavior is not adaptive in
certain group settings and therefore will not evolve. After thinking about the model,
I realized that such results cannot be expected from this design until the additional
complexity of heterogeneous groups and procreation/survival of fit agents are added.
The purpose of simulations is to reveal findings that cannot be logically predicted
due to model complexities. If we knew why the current observable behavioral patters
evolved, we would not be running simulations to find out. For this baseline model at
its relatively low level of complexity I can still make reasonable predictions and draw
hypotheses as to what outcomes I can expect once the simulations are run. As this
research agenda continues and the model becomes more complex, properties of the
group will become impossible to predict in detail.
Acceptance rate and group wealth are directly related. For any rejection, while the
individual’s wealth is not changed, both parties and the whole group will be poorer
as compared to if the offer was accepted. For this reason, the group wealth will be the
15
highest where rejections are the lowest. Since punishments are automatic zero offers or
rejections and rational agents do not punish, I expect both the group wealth and the
acceptance rate to be the highest for the rational group, followed by the groups where
only individual agents punish outperforming the groups where every agent punishes.
Overpunishment will create a financial deficiency for groups where every member
punishes. This phenomenon was already identified in Axelrod’s prisoner’s dilemma
simulation tournament with the grim trigger strategy where the agent cooperates only
until the other agent defects.1. After that the grim trigger is tripped, and punishment
(realized by defection) will occur in all future rounds regardless of the possible gains
from mutual cooperation. [16] This strategy did poorly because it punished defection
and never forgave the loss of possible mutual gains. The grim trigger fell into the
trap of overpunishment.
On the other hand, I expect the rational group to have less equality. The agents in
the rational group will quickly figure out that their optimal xˆ for each offer is around
.5 and therefore will always offer 0 or 1. The offerers who keep 9 and offer 1 will in the
next round be more likely to become the allocators again, creating an ever increasing
wealth gap between the haves and have nots of the group. This gap should increase
as the offerers are more likely to become offerers and keep offering 1 to the recipients.
To sum up the expectations:
• Acceptance rate and Wealth: Rational Group > Realistic Group where Indi-
viduals Punish > Realistic Group where the Whole Group Punishes
• Within group equality: Realistic Groups > rational Group
1In prisoner’s dilemma the agents’ options are to cooperate or defect; mutual cooperation yields
the highest payoffs but both parties have an incentive to defect. Since it pays a premium to the
agent that defects as long as the other cooperates, mutual defection is the Nash equilibrium and
yields a low payoff to both parties.
16
Chapter 6
Findings
6.1 Group Harmony and Conflict (Acception Rates)
As expected rational agents’ acception rate (and mean expected offer) drops to .5 and
settles around this point. (see Figure 6.1 )
Figure 6.1: Acception rate for the group of rational agents
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For groups where the agents have realistic acception functions and the individuals
engage in punishing behavior, the results are more colorful (see Figure 6.2 ). Note
that the scale of the charts are not the same, so at first glance they might seem
misleading. In the later chart the high point of the Y axis is around .5, whereas .5
for the rational group’s chart was the mid-point.
Figure 6.2: Acception rate for groups where the individual punishes
Black, Red, Green: punishment for 3, 25, 150 encounters
Blue, Turq, Purple: punishment for 3, 25, 150 rounds.
Notice the distinct difference between the results where punishment is measured
by encounters, versus where punishment is measured by rounds. Where punishment is
measured by rounds, and agents hold grudges for a certain period of time, (regardless
of whether they had an opportunity to get back at the social deviant) the level of
punishment is substantially lower, and therefore total acception rate is higher. In
18
reality a mistreated agent will encounter the unfair allocator g
n−1 times.
1 So for our
cases where a grudge is held for 3, 25, and 150 rounds, the mistreated agent will see
to punish the social deviant .02, .17 times, and once2, on average.
Compare this with punishment administered for 3, 25, and 150 encounters. It is
clear that acception rate is much lower, even if we compare the group where agents
punish for 3 encounters to the group where agents hold grudges for 150 rounds. This
is because punishment of any unacceptable offer will be exercised for three rounds, no
matter how long the agents have to wait to meet again (as compared to punishment
occurring once on average).
Inspecting the chart, the most visible phenomenon arises in the group where
individuals punish for 25 rounds. Acception rate in this group quickly drops to about
.30% and starts to climb back up at around round 5000, after which it dips again, but
not as much as it did before. What is going on here? If you think about the processes
at play within the group, many agents make at least one low offer, or find someone who
finds even a reasonable high offer unacceptable. The offended agent will then punish
the “deviant” for the following 25 encounters. The more discontent an agent creates
around him/her self, the less people will play the game with her/him. Practically,
this decreases the number of acceptions but does not eliminate them. During this
time each agent has enough time to think about their socially unacceptable offers and
can readjust their offer function to a relatively high xˆ, where the cycle starts again.
Averaging across the behavior of the 150 agents in the group and across 25 simulations
these trends become less significant as time passes and as the individual agents make
upward adjustments and dip again at different times, hence the (on average) smaller
dip next time around.
Since I thought it would be interesting to see how this trend continues, I ran one
1where g is the number of rounds the grudge is held and n is group size.
2respectively
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simulation for 50000 rounds and plotted the results (see Figure 6.3 ). Due to the lack
of computing power and the analysis software’s (R’s) inability to deal with arrays
much larger than I was feeding it, I was not able to run this simulation several times
and average across the results, which is why you see much more scatter around the
trend line in the graph. On this graph it becomes obvious that the trend of ever
diminishing dips continues until they become impossible to observe by naked eye and
completely disappear.
Figure 6.3: Further Exploration of Acception Rate
Acception rate for the group where the individual punishes for 25 encounters.
Single simulation run for 50000 times
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For groups where agents have realistic acception functions but the whole group
engages in the punishing of agents who make unacceptably low offers, the results are
quite different (see Figure 6.4 ). Similarly to the groups where only the individuals
punish, the groups where a grudge is measured by rounds do better versus groups that
punish until they get back at the deviant agents. It is also important to point out that
these groups, where punishment is measured by rounds, tend to do worse as compared
to their counterparts where only the individual punishes. To some extent this makes
sense. We can expect lower levels of group harmony for groups where everyone gets on
everyone else’s case versus those where individuals keep their grudges to themselves
instead of telling everyone how bad other members of the group are.
Figure 6.4: Acception rate for groups where the group punishes
Black, Red, Green: punishment for 3, 25, 150 encounters
Blue, Turq, Purple: punishment for 3, 25, 150 rounds.
For groups where the punishment is measured by encounters again, a wavy pattern
emerges, most visible for the group where grudges are held for 150 rounds. The reason
for the emergence of this wavy pattern is not much different from the explanation of
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the waves for the groups where only the individual punishes. But the shapes are much
different for a reason. If you look at the acceptance rate for the group where agents
punish for 150 encounters, the acceptance rate actually hits 0. Due to the properties
of random number generation and Gaussian laws with many cases, it becomes clear
that each agent will either drop at least one low offer or meet someone who cannot
be satisfied even with a relatively high offer. For the following rounds this agent will
be excluded from all transactions until s/he meets everyone else in the group for 150
times. But during this long time this agent has to think about how much they offer
the next time around, their expected offer adjusts back to high values. Every agent
in the group goes through several waves of this unpleasant experience, and averaged
across the whole group this phenomenon is the wavy pattern what we see on the
graph. Note that similar but much more dampened trends are also present for groups
where grudges are held for 3 and 25 encounters.3
6.2 Group Wealth
We have already established that group wealth is a function of acceptance rate. Fig-
ures 6.5 and 6.6 show a clear positive relationship between group wealth and accep-
tance rate for all groups. Again the group that shows the best performance is the
rational group, followed by the groups where individuals punish for a given number of
rounds. Note the sharp break and slow drop off in the wealth line for the group where
a grudge is held for 25 rounds (Figure 6.5 - green line). This is a direct function of
the climb and second dip in acceptance rate already discussed above.
For the groups where every member punishes, overpunishment has a clear impact
on the group members’ pocketbooks. It is interesting to note that in these cases the
3To verify this you might have to consult with additional charts presented in Appendix B.
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Figure 6.5: Wealth of groups where the individual punishes
Black: rational individuals
Red, Green, Blue: punishment for 3, 25, 150 encounters
Turq, Purple, Yellow: punishment for 3, 25, 150 encounters
wealth of the group is more a function of the length of punishment and not of whether
it is measured by rounds or encounters. The two wealthiest groups are the ones that
punish for three rounds and three encounters followed by the ones that punish for 25
rounds and 25 encounters and so on...
6.3 Group Equality
The measure of inequality in economics is the Gini index, with lower numbers rep-
resenting more equal societies. (For an extended discussion of how the Gini index is
measured, see Appendix C.) Though the Gini index is predominantly used to mea-
sure distribution of wealth within countries, I found no theoretical or mathematical
objection to applying it to our groups of 150.
The rational group performed better than expected, presenting an ever increasing
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Figure 6.6: Wealth of groups where the group punishes
Black: rational individuals
Red, Green, Blue: punishment for 3, 25, 150 encounters
Turq, Purple, Yellow: punishment for 3, 25, 150 encounters
equality outperforming most other groups. The only groups with higher equality are
the ones where individuals punish and the level of punishment is relatively low (3 and
25, but not 150) and measured by rounds and not by encounters (see Figure 6.7 ).
For groups where inequality was measured by encounters, the Gini index decreased
at a much slower rate and increased for groups with high levels of punishment.
For groups where all members punish, the rational group outperformed all the
other groups (see Figure 6.8 ). Also, similarly to group wealth, equality was more
a function of the rate and not the mode of punishment. The groups where every-
one punished for 3 rounds or encounters outperformed the groups where everyone
punished for 25 rounds or encounters, etc.
Puzzled by the exceptionally good performance of the rational group, I decided to
do some more post-hoc exploration (see results in Figure 6.9 ). Initially I suspected
that this was due to group size. I suspected that as members of the rational group
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Figure 6.7: Level of inequality (Gini index) for groups where the individual punishes
Black: rational individuals
Red, Green, Blue: punishment for 3, 25, 150 encounters
Turq, Purple, Yellow: punishment for 3, 25, 150 encounters
Note: For better presentation first 200 rounds were not plotted
Figure 6.8: Level of inequality (Gini index) for groups where the group punishes
Black: rational individuals
Red, Green, Blue: punishment for 3, 25, 150 encounters
Turq, Purple,Yellow: punishment for 3, 25, 150 encounters
25
figure out that the most logical offer is a low one, and as the receiving agents accept
these low offers, group equality would decrease. Remember, the probability of having
the powerful position, being the allocator in the transaction, is the function of the
wealth difference of the two agents interacting. Since in the beginning all agents start
with 0 dollars, group equality is perfect. This utopian state quickly erodes as some
agents gain some money4. It is logical to assume that in a group of 150, enough agents
will meet others with similar wealth, and therefore inequalities will not emerge. This
will be amplified by the fact that it takes rational agents some time to figure out
that very low offers are also accepted. But when I decreased group size to 10, the
results remained. In fact inequalities kept on decreasing until I fixed the probability
of the more wealthy agent becoming the allocator, regardless of the magnitude of
the difference in wealth. At .75 probability inequalities settled and stayed about the
same and at .8 inequality started to increase. This verifies that inequalities could
start to increase if large enough wealth gaps could develop in the first place, but in
this model, this is not the case.
4The Gini index is not efficient in measuring equality in the first rounds. Let us assume that we
only have two agents. When one agent has $1 and another has $9 it will be seen as highly unequal.
As wealth overall increases but the difference in wealth remains the same, for example when one
agent has $100 and another $109, the distribution of wealth will be seen more equal. For this reason,
and to make the graphs more presentable, I sometimes dropped the first two hundred observations
from the charts
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Figure 6.9: Level of inequality (Gini index) for groups with rational individuals
Black - Powerful position decided by proportion of wealth
Red - Same as above with small group - 10 agents in the group
Green - Wealthier agents becomes allocator 80% of the time
Blue - Wealthier agents becomes allocator 75% of the time
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Chapter 7
Discussion of the Results
First, I will evaluate the results based on how the design needs to be improved, and
what these baseline numbers mean and then discuss possible implications to political
theory or empirical research.
The two main elements missing from this design are heterogeneous groups and
error. Simulation studies in the past have suggested that heterogeneity of behavioral
patterns can have a radical impact on the evolution of the group [12]. From a soci-
etal perspective it is clear that components of individual decision making varies from
person to person. A recent study utilizing experimental game theory and fMRI tech-
nology concluded that the areas of the brain which are active during a decision vary
across people and have a significant impact on the decision function of the person
[20]. I would hypothesize that the results could be significantly different depending
on how and to what extent heterogeneity of groups was achieved. We know from
experimental studies, that context matters [21] [22]. Unfortunately building context
into multi-agent models is no small task. Furthermore the generalizability of such
models without the contextual element is always questionable, therefore researchers
must strive to incorporate the contextual framework in the model and pay careful
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attention to the validity and generalizability of the inferences they draw. Of course
context goes beyond group composition. In this section I will cite other contextual
elements that, if incorporated, might lead to radically different results.
Another possible improvement of the model once heterogeneity of groups is in-
cluded would be some type of replication method for agents. It would be possible to
give agents a life span and have them procreate with the more well-off agents having a
higher chance of procreating. Results could then include the change of within-group
distribution of certain behaviors. With such a model, the rule of fixed group size
would also need to be reconsidered, and the comparability of groups with different
sizes analyzed.
As far as evaluation of the results is concerned, it became increasingly clear that a
distinction will need to be made between rejection and punishing behavior. With the
current software it is not possible to separate the two behaviors. Also, in light of this
problem, other designs of agent interaction should be considered that allow for clearer
distinctions between the immediate rejection of an offer, a refusal to engage in social
interaction, and long term grudge-holding and punishing behavior. Using ultimatum
bargaining was extremely convenient since the large body of empirical research using
this experimental design allowed for good agent designs. The downside of ultimatum
bargaining is that rejection of interaction and socially unacceptable offers are not
clearly separated from punishing behavior. The empirical researchers should start
using designs that more clearly separate these behaviors.
To complicate the issue further, empirical research shows that people weigh costs
and gains differently. Framing the same question in terms of gains and losses triggers
different responses from people [23]. Currently, punishment in ultimatum bargaining
is framed as forfeiting possible gains. While neo-classical microeconomic rationality
is indifferent to the framing of losses and gains, we have sufficient empirical evidence
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that if punishment would be framed in terms of enduring costs to the punisher, be-
havioral patterns would change significantly. This further complicates the design
of agents. Though prospect theory does give us a quantifiable mechanism for dis-
tinguishing costs and gains, over-complication of simulation design can increase the
chances of untraceable bugs, makes isolation of behavioral effects and interpreting
results increasingly difficult.
Another obvious improvement to the model would be a varying amount in the
divisible pot. It is unrealistic to claim that every social interaction has similar im-
portance in people’s lives. It is unrealistic to claim that every economic transaction
is the same. Take, for example, something as simple as every day purchases. When I
buy batteries at a gas station, I know that I am being over-charged because I could
get the same batteries in Wal-Mart for half the price. I still buy. Yet when I am
purchasing a car, I would not consider buying from the dealer that sells it for twice
as much and makes three times the profit versus other dealers. Similarly to the ad-
dition of a distinction between losses and loss of gains to the behavioral functions of
realistic agents, the addition of considerations such as the weight of the transaction
in an agent’s life would further complicate the behavioral functions.
The design of realistic behavioral functions is problematic. Take, for example,
the conflicting results from the experiments which triggered this study. Third parties
to a transaction are reluctant to punish deviant behavior, especially if the costs of
the punishment are not also endured by themselves. If the costs of punishment are
not deferred, these conclusions might not be valid and peoples’ decisions could be
significantly different. Yet, people still care about what outside observers to their
transactions think about their behavior.
These concerns could legitimately trigger conclusions that the world cannot be
modeled with game theoretical models since these reduce the complexities of decisions
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and ignore small but significant factors. While I believe this is a valid concern, I would
still rather try to model the real world than to give up on research. Hopefully, through
artificial intelligence technology and advances in evolutionary game theory and multi-
agent modeling simulations, we can create more and more realistic environments. One
day we might realistically replicate the real world within a computer.
Looking at the results of the simulation, I am going to conclude that the offer
function also has flaws. While the function looked very reasonable on the drawing
board, in practice any agent playing against a rational recipient would figure out that
the best offer is 1 and not hover around trying to get away with a zero offer 50% of the
time. One proposition to overcome this problem would be to decrease the standard
deviation of the offer after every round. On the other hand, this change would lead
to non-varying, deterministic offers after a certain amount of rounds depending on
the standard deviation’s pre-set value and the size of the decrease. With such a
design early variation in behavior would not be comparable to late variation within
a simulation. As was clear from the results, some patterns take several thousand
rounds to emerge. With such an intervention these patterns might be altered before
they can emerge.
Another possible way of dealing with the offerer function is to make it less incre-
mental and more categorical. It would be possible to treat all six of the possible offers
(0, 1, 2...5) as separate categories and assign probabilities to their occurrences, then
develop a learning function using Bayesian updating that would modify the probabil-
ities, based on the successes and failures of past offers. Though this approach might
sound reasonable, its scalability is limited. Consider the possibility of not restricting
offers to whole dollars. The number of possible offers jumps from six to 600. Also,
with the possibility of varying allocatable pots as proposed above, I cannot see this
categorical allocation approach working.
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Lastly, we need information as to the cognitive mechanics of people’s angers and
grudges. Do people generally forgive over time or do they hold a grudge until they
get back at the person, until they get retribution? What determines the strength
and length of social punishment? If answers to these questions are not clear cut (as I
expect they will not be, I expect to see tremendous variation across people), what are
the properties of the variation? What percent of people forgive over time? What are
unforgivable offenses? To what extent the magnitude of the offense is a function of
the level of grudge it triggers? These questions will have to be answered empirically
and incorporated into the behavior functions of agents.
Agents within groups do not necessarily have to be homogeneous as to how long
they hold a grudge or if they forgive over time. Further within group variation can
be introduced into the model through these mechanisms.
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Chapter 8
Conclusion
Though I forcefully warn against drawing definitive conclusions based on this prelim-
inary model, I will go ahead and do it anyway for observations that were strongly
consistent across all the simulations. It is obvious that high levels of punishment de-
creases the well being of the group. Fehr and Rockenbach presents evidence that “un-
fair” (high) levels of sanctions lead to decreased levels of cooperation within groups.
The results of this simulation back up these findings and offer explanation for the
reasons why this is the case in today’s societies [24].
These findings have clear policy implications. Government should be careful with
punishment, and maybe we should encourage the development of a more forgiving
society. It might be a stretch to claim that the results of this simulation definitively
translate into the need to view the prison system as a rehabilitation tool and not a
punishing institution, but the results surely make such suggestions.
It is clear that higher rates of punishment have a negative impact on the devel-
opment of equality. Though most results show that equality is increasing, for groups
with high levels of punishment this increase is significantly slower and at the highest
levels of punishment might turn into a decrease. Equality statistics showed better re-
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sults for groups where punishment was set to very, possibly unrealistically low levels.
These results beg the question, why did punishment develop in the first place? Based
on these findings it might be reasonable to formulate a hypothesis that punishment
is a tool that evolved to reinforce the status quo.
The bottom line on equality statistics is that equality is increasing for most groups.
Though ever since Marx wrote the Communist Manifesto, political circles have paid
disproportionate attention to increases of the income gap and decreases of economic
equality in society. Popular examples would be the ever increasing salaries of CEOs,
professional athletes and popular culture stars [21]. On the other hand critics of
Marxist theorists would claim that quality of life disproportionately increased for the
working class compared to the owners of the means of production. Technology has
brought entertainment, transportation and access to inconceivable information within
reach of the majority of the world’s population. Empirical verification, especially on
a global scale, measured in quality of life and not figures of currency, might verify
that the gap between the rich and the poor is decreasing and not increasing. Further
empirical research is needed to draw definitive conclusions.
And lastly the design that verified the hypothesis that equality is actually increas-
ing and not decreasing was the one where the level of power agents have over the social
process was fixed at high levels for wealthier agents. In all other cases this simulation
used a wealth proportional allocation of the powerful allocator position between two
agents. But how proportional this is in the real world requires additional empirical
scrutiny. If I have twice the wealth compared to another person, do I on average
have twice the power over our social and economical interaction? It is possible that
as the income gap increases the power gap increases at higher or possibly lower rates.
Answers to this question have to come from empirical evaluations of society.
The results of the study, at first, might sound discouraging. The findings will not
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directly lead us to an understanding of why irrational behavior evolved. Based on
this model rational behavior is what makes sense from an evolutionary perspective.
But if this is the case, the question remains. Why are we not rational? I would be
hesitant to draw conclusion based on this model.
For an evaluation of the merits of this study we have to return to its goals. The
main goal of this research agenda was to create an evolutionary model that leads
to insights as to why neo-classical rational behavior might not be rational from an
evolutionary sense. While this study did not definitively answer the research question
and conclude the research agenda, it led to insights on how to design a better model
and its results served as a baseline for the analysis of future results. If we consider
a pilot study in empirical research, working out unforeseen issues with the survey
instrument or experimental design is the goal. Once we evaluate the results in light
of these goals, the study is a sufficient fist step in a research agenda.
This study has raised several questions about how the world works, and hopefully
given important guidance and pointed to a meaningful direction of empirical research.
With future analysis of the behavioral trends laid out in the discussion and the con-
clusion, more realistic agents and better analysis of the evolution of behavioral traits
will become possible.
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Appendix A
Appendix A: Technical Information
Simulations were coded in Java. The program’s output was comma separated values
that were sorted with Perl scripts, loaded into R and analyzed and plotted though R.
Most of the analysis was done on a Fujitsu P-2110 with 867 MHz Transmeta
Crusoe CPU and 240MB of RAM. Additionally an e-machines laptop with an AMD
64 CPU was also used for running the simulations. After running the benchmarks
it became obvious that on the Fujtisu alone the simulations would have to run for
about 40 days non-stop to finish. The simulations produced around 15 GB of raw
data. Individual processes like loading this raw data into R for analysis, and sorting
and calculating the group averages and gini indexes often took several hours. R often
informed me that the data array I was about to load was too large for its capacity.
Due to the lack of adequate computing power I often was not able to go into as
much detail as I wanted to. I often wanted to run the simulation for longer than 10000
rounds, and it would have been nice to vary other variables more (like the extent of
punishment). If I could go back to the beginning of this research I would not start it
until I had adequate computing power to do it better, do it right and save me a ton of
frustration, headache and compromises. (I would also have Andras, the programmer,
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code this is something other than Java.)
Due to the insane amount of data that was created I will not make the simulation
output available through the web. On the other hand this document, the simulation
source code and binaries, and some of the pre-coded scripts used for sorting and
analysis, along with the LATEX source code and charts of this document, will be
made available at http://www.littvay.hu/thesis/ If you wish to receive a copy of the
simulation output for replication purposes, I have it on CDs and can snail-mail you
the data. With such requests please e-mail me at levi@bigred.unl.edu or contact me
through my website at http://www.littvay.hu
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Appendix B
Appendix B: Additional Charts
In addition to the charts presented in the body of the study, I have prepared addi-
tional charts that make it easier to compare groups across different properties. This
appendix is devoted to the presentation of these charts.
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Figure B.1: Acception rate for groups where punishment rate was set to 150
Black: rational individuals
Red/Green: individual punishes for 150 rounds/encounters
Blue/Turq: group punishes for 150 rounds/encounters
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Figure B.2: Acception rate for groups where punishment rate was set to 25
Black: rational individuals
Red/Green: individual punishes for 150 rounds/encounters
Blue/Turq: group punishes for 150 rounds/encounters
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Figure B.3: Acception rate for groups where punishment rate was set to 3
Black: rational individuals
Red/Green: individual punishes for 150 rounds/encounters
Blue/Turq: group punishes for 150 rounds/encounters
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Figure B.4: Wealth for groups where punishment rate was set to 150
Black: rational individuals
Red/Green: individual punishes for 150 rounds/encounters
Blue/Turq: group punishes for 150 rounds/encounters
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Figure B.5: Wealth for groups where punishment rate was set to 25
Black: rational individuals
Red/Green: individual punishes for 150 rounds/encounters
Blue/Turq: group punishes for 150 rounds/encounters
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Figure B.6: Wealth for groups where punishment rate was set to 3
Black: rational individuals
Red/Green: individual punishes for 150 rounds/encounters
Blue/Turq: group punishes for 150 rounds/encounters
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Figure B.7: Level of inequality for groups where punishment rate was set to 150
Black: rational individuals
Red/Green: individual punishes for 150 rounds/encounters
Blue/Turq: group punishes for 150 rounds/encounters
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Figure B.8: Level of inequality for groups where punishment rate was set to 25
Black: rational individuals not plotted.
Red/Green: individual punishes for 150 rounds/encounters
Blue/Turq: group punishes for 150 rounds/encounters
Note: For better presentation first 200 rounds were not plotted
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Figure B.9: Level of inequality for groups where punishment rate was set to 3
Black: rational individuals
Red/Green: individual punishes for 150 rounds/encounters
Blue/Turq: group punishes for 150 rounds/encounters
Note: For better presentation first 200 rounds were not plotted
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Appendix C
Appendix C: The Gini Index
This appendix presents a conceptual description of what the Gini index is. Of course
a calculus heavy mathematical explanation of how the Gini index is measured and
calculated does exist, but for the purposes of this paper, it is unnecessary. The Gini
index was calculated with R using the ineq package’s gini function. The ineq package
was designed to calculate measures of inequality.
The Gini index is an index of equality within a group. How it is measured is best
represented by a chart; throughout the description I will refer to the figure in the
Appendix.
Imagine a perfectly equal society. Perfectly equal means that 20% of the popula-
tion has 20% of the wealth, 50% of the population has 50% of the wealth, etc. This
state is represented by the diagonal line above the blue areas. Now imagine a more
realistic society that is less equal, where the poorest 25% of the population has 10%
of the wealth, the lowest 50% of the population has about 20% of the group’s wealth
and lowest 80% has about half of the wealth (the top 20% owning the other half).
This state is represented by the line between the blue and the purple areas. The Gini
index is the area between the perfectly equal and the actual state, the blue area.
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Figure C.1: The Gini Index
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